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In August 1989 President George Bush signed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 1 into law. Congress enacted FIRREA in response to its concern over the increasing losses sustained by the savings and loan industry and the costs to the taxpayers of the resulting bailout. 2 FIRREA attempts to avert future problems caused by mismanagement of both savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and banks, and furnishes funds for the S&L bailout. 3 FIRREA also imposes civil liability on officers and directors who mismanage insured depository institutions. Toward this goal, FIR-REA supplies a standard of liability under which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can sue S&L officers and directors. 4 This standard, found in section 1821(k), states that Dec. 16, 1991 , at Dl (Regulators accused Arizona's governor of improperly taking $8 million in "development fees" for a real estate deal while he was a director of an S&L that invested $52 million and ultimately lost $38 million in the same deal. The governor and a partner were also guaranteed 38% of the deal's profits for only a $432 investment.); David R. Sands, FDIC Sues McLean S&L Ex-Officials, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1991, at CS (FDIC alleges officials made $7.6 million in unsecured loans to subsidiary that was losing $12 million, and that two officials received bonuses for anticipated profits that never materialized). 1119 [Vol. 90:1119 of, or at the request or direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation -(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution, (2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or (3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an insured depository institution or its affiliate in connection with assistance provided under section 1823 of this title, for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the corporation under other applicable law. 5 Congress intended section 1821(k) to preempt state "insulating" statutes, which commonly shield the directors and officers of corporations and financial institutions from suits for breach of a duty to the institution. 6 These statutes typically shield directors and officers from liability for certain breaches of fiduciary duty or permit the articles of incorporation to do so. They do not, however, permit corporations to protect these actors when they engage in reckless or intentional misconduct. 7 In states that limit liability of directors and officers to that resulting from particularly egregious behavior, FIRREA expands potential liability by holding agents of financial institutions to a more stringent standard of care.
Several courts have held that FIRREA mandates a uniform federal 5. 12 U.S.C.A. 182l(k) (West 1989) (emphasis added).
6. See 135 CONG. REc. S4278-79 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989 ) (statement of Sen. Riegle). When interpreting a statute, courts "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" by following the statute's plain meaning. 11 To determine a statute's plain meaning, courts "must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." 12 Further, when focusing on specific statutory language, courts must give that language its "ordinary meaning." 13 A word's "ordinary meaning" has been interpreted by the courts as being the dictionary meaning given to that word. 14 Section 1821(k) provides that directors or officers of insured institutions may be held personally liable for conduct that demonstrates gross negligence or a greater disregard of that standard of care. In other words, the FDIC may bring suits for gross negligence, or for simple negligence in states that allow such actions. 15 Because the statute does not profess to provide an exclusive standard of care, courts should not imply such exclusivity. 16 If Congress had intended to remove negligence suits pursued under state law from the FDIC's arsenal, Congress could have said that "[a] director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held liable . . . only for gross negligence."
The nonexclusive nature of the first sentence in section 1821(k), which imposes the gross negligence standard, sheds light on the provision's next sentence. The second sentence clarifies the first: Congress did not intend section 182l(k) to "impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." 17 This portion of the statute suggests that section 1821(k) neither promulgates a uniform standard of care nor preempts the FDIC's right to pursue actions for simple negligence under state law. Indeed, if the first sentence created an ex-elusive standard of care, the second sentence would be surplusage; 18 such a reading would violate "the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative." 19 Moreover, if the first sentence somehow provides a uniform standard of care, the first and second sentences of section 1821(k) are contradictory: the first sentence would preempt all other law in this area while the second preserves rights belonging to the FDIC under existing law. 20 Additionally, a separate rule of statutory construction dictates that "applicable law" includes all relevant law not otherwise specifically excluded. 24. Courts have not distinguished "banks" from "savings and loan associations" in the context of the duties owed to depositors by officers and directors. Furthermore, FIRREA substituted "insured depository institution" for "insured bank" in all relevant provisions. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 20l(a)(l), 103 Stat. 187 (1989) . An "insured depository institution" was then defined as including "any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Corporation pursuant to the Act." FIRREA, § 204(c)(2), 103 Stat. 191 (1989) 40 Under this view, Congress did not intend to preserve common law causes of action, but merely desired to avoid inconsistencies within FIRREA. This reading, however, is inconsistent with the statutory language. Section 1818 provides the FDIC with authority to take certain administrative enforcement actions against officers or directors of depository institutions.41 Section 1821(k) applies only to civil actions brought by the FDIC, so its gross negligence standard does not apply to enforcement actions taken pursuant to section 1818. 42 Similarly, section 1821(/) defines the proper measure of damages for various parties, including officers and directors, who are found liable for the "improvident or otherwise improper use or investment of any insured depository institution's assets .... " 43 The savings provision of section 182l{k) is not needed to preserve the measure of damages announced in section 1821(/) because section 1821(/) applies only to violators of the standard of care promulgated by section 1821(k).
The minority view that "other applicable law" refers only to other sections of FIRREA reads section 1821(k) to say "[n]othing in FIR-REA shall affect the rights of the FDIC found in FIRREA." This awkward reading is precisely why a statute refers to itself, rather than to other federal or state law, "by stating 'in this Title' or 'in this Chapter.' " 44 The absence of such language in section 182l(k) implies that Congress intended the savings provision to apply generally to all "other applicable law." Interpreting section 1821(k) to provide a uniform standard of gross negligence renders its savings provision pointless. The term "other applicable law" must refer to laws outside FIRREA. In a slightly different vein, the court in FDIC v. Swager stated that "other applicable law" as used in section 1821(k) means all applicable law other than state law. 46 The court believed that because Congress used the word "state" in the first sentence of section 182l(k), Congress would have used the word "state" in the second sentence if it had intended to include state law within "other applicable law." 47 The court stated that if Congress had intended section 182l(k) to strengthen or broaden the FDIC's power to recover damages from insolvent bank directors and officers, the final sentence should have read: "Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under any applicable law." 48 The Swager court's argument thus rests on a one word distinction: "other" versus "any." Not only does this change fail to alter the meaning of section 1821(k), 49 but it also unduly emphasizes a distinction that Congress probably did not contemplate. One can also turn the Swager rationale on its head: if Congress intended to save only federal laws, it would have stated, in the second sentence, that "federal law is not impaired or affected by section 1821(k)." Alternatively, if Congress desired to preempt all state law other than that which defines the terms "gross negligence" and "intentional tortious conduct," it would have stated, in the second sentence of section 1821(k), that "all other applicable state law is preempted."
The plain language of section 182l(k) supports the interpretation that it establishes a minimum standard of care. Because the last sentence of section 1821(k) states that FIRREA does not affect the FDIC's rights under "other applicable law," the FDIC can still pursue negligence actions in those states that allow them. To read section 1821(k) in any other way would ignore the plain language of the statute.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
This Part examines the legislative history of FIRREA and concludes that Congress intended to preempt only those state laws that insulate officers and directors from liability for conduct violating stan- Act. 494 U.S. at 926-27. The Court held that to interpret the language "nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency •.
• in accordance with applicable laws" as applying to other provisions of the Reform Act would make the provision "a pointless tautology. Utah 1991) , the court indicated that it did not find the report persuasive because (1) the Banking Comittee did not issue the report until two months after the Senate had considered its version of FIRREA, (2) the report was not directed to the final version of FIRREA, and (3) the report failed to consider the before-enactment/after-enactment distinction in the last sentence of the section. 763 F. Supp. at 539. However, as Senator Cranston explained, "there was no section-by-section analysis provided by the committee for the bill when it was reported simply be· cause of the time rush constraints facing the committee as it moved the bill to the floor." 135 CoNG. REc. S4283 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Cranston). Additionally, the report merely restates the remarks that Senator Riegle made on the Senate floor during the de· bate over the bill. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Furthermore, reports are often published after the adoption of a bill and still considered to be authoritative. See, e.g .. Home Sav.
Bank v. Gillam, No. 90-35765, 1991 WL 276241, at *9-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 1991) (citing the committee report as authority for its conclusion). With respect to the second criticism, the Senate considered the House changes in the bill and did not indicate that it felt the House had made any substantive changes in the provision adopted by the Senate. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. The third criticism is specious because no before/after distinction exists in the second sentence of § 182l(k), so it is obvious that the Senate intended its bill to allow negligence actions, which could be brought by the FDIC before the enactment of FIRREA, also to be brought after FIRREA's enactment. cause the S&L crisis. The interpretation of section 1821(k) as a minimum standard is consistent with this purpose. Such a standard curbs dangerous investment practices by increasing the potential sanctions on officers and directors if the investments harm the institution. 61 A fourth senator stated that FIRREA "increases the enforcement powers and remedies the Government has to go after fraudulent and incompetent practices." 62 The minority view that section 182l(k) is a uniform standard would, to the contrary, decrease the effectiveness of the FDIC's enforcement practices. Under the uniform standard of care, a negligent officer or director may escape liability under the enforcement mechanisms, leaving the FDIC with no other avenue to regain lost funds. 63 In support of the uniform standard interpretation, the court in FDIC v. Canfield 64 used the statements of Senators Heflin and Sanford expressing concern over the FDIC's authority over state institutions. The court suggested that these senators desired a general preemption of state law, rather than a preemption of only insulating statutes. 65 This interpretation, however, is largely unfounded. For example, not only did Senator Heflin direct his comments at the civil penalties included in Title IX of the bill -not section 1821(k), which is found in Title II -but he also stated that his recommendations were minor. 66 Senator Sanford expressed support for the managers' amendments, which, as previously noted, were intended only to preempt insulating statutes. 67
B. House and Conference Committee Intent
Neither the House of Representatives nor the Conference Committee expressly addressed the issue of whether section 1821(k) provides a uniform standard or a minimum standard of gross negligence. The The House suggested several times that FIRREA would increase the supervisory and enforcement authority of the FDIC. 70 An interpretation that FIRREA preempts all state and federal law claims for negligence would weaken, not enhance, the power of the FDIC to oversee the activities of financial institutions. 71 Testimony during House hearings on FIRREA also demonstrates that the House was aware of the need to impose liability on numerous parties whose negligent actions contributed to the problems of S&Ls. 72 Courts advancing the uniform standard interpretation of section 1821(k) have relied almost exclusively on the Conference Report in concluding that no "clearly expressed legislative intention" existed regarding whether FIRREA preempts negligence actions brought by the FDIC. 73 The Conference Report states that section 182l(k) "preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity against officers or directors of an insured depository institution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care .... " 74 At first blush this language seems to imply that the conferees disregarded both the intent of the Senate and the statements made by several representatives that FIRREA would effect only a narrow preemption of state and federal law. However, an examination of the dynamics of the enactment process reveals that the report does not necessarily conflict with the conclusion that Congress intended FIRREA simply to preempt insulating statutes.
The Conference Report is inconclusive regarding the preemption issue. First, its drafters wrote the Report very hastily. 75 Because of FIRREA's rapid journey through Congress, the authors of the Report did not have time to write an in-depth description of every provision in the bill. 76 The authors s~ply e~pressed their desire to preempt state law to some extent -by superseding insulating statutes -but did not clearly articulate their desire to allow the FDIC to bring state law claims in states with a simple negligence standard.
Furthermore, the authors of the Conference Report never indicated that the rewording of section 1821(k) represented a substantive change from the original versions of this section approved by the Senate. 77 75. As Senator Riegle stated, Congress put together "the most sweeping financial services reform package ... in record time." He went on to say, "[i]t is roughly a thousand pages of . legislation, and any time a bill has to be that long because of its complexity, particularly of a problem of this kind, it speaks for itself, of its far-ranging nature and the difficulty of doing it and doing it on a timely basis and having it right." 135 CoNG. REc. S9872 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989 182l(k) strongly implies that the Committee intended no substantive change in the meaning of this section. The similarity between the language of the two provisions also indicates that the House meant to make no substantive changes in the provision. 79 The Conference Report, then, is consistent with the minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k).
C. Senate Consideration of the House and Conference Version of FIRREA
The Senate considered the changes made in the House and Conference version of FIRREA and eventually passed that version with several minor amendments. 80 Several senators reiterated their earlier views that FIRREA increased, rather than decreased, the control of the FDIC over insured depository institutions. 81 If any senator believed that section 1821(k) as promulgated by the House substantively changed the Senate's version of that section, the debate does not show it. As the Senate debate over the House version of FIRREA showed, 83 the Senate believed the House changes concerned only whether the S&L bailout should be financed "off-budget" or "on-budget" and whether the affordable housing amendments added to FIRREA by the House should be retained. 84 No senator indicated that the House had made any substantive changes in section 1821(k) -in fact, the statements made in the Senate show that the intent of section 1821(k) remained unchanged, even if the words had been slightly altered. 85 Thus, the legislative history of FIRREA supports the minimum standard interpretation of section 182l(k). The Senate rejected an attempt to preempt generally state law in the area of officer and director liability in favor of a version of FIRREA that preempted only state insulating statutes. The House and the Conference Committee, although changing the proposed language of section 1821(k), did not intend to change substantively the meaning of the provision passed by the Senate.
Ill. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 182l(k)
This Part examines policy arguments for and against the preemption of state law by section 1821(k)'s gross negligence standard. It concludes that the policies and purposes underlying FIRREA weigh in favor of reading section 1821(k) as preempting only insulating statutes and preserving the right of the FDIC to bring negligence actions in those states that allow them.
Congress, when enacting FIRREA, stated that its primary purposes included promoting a safe and stable system of housing finance, curtailing excessively speculative investments, putting the federal deposit insurance fund on sound financial footing, providing funds from nontaxpayer sources to help pay for the S&L bailout, and strengthening the powers of the FDIC to oversee financial institutions. 86 
A. Arguments Advanced in Support of the Minimum Standard Interpretation of Section 182J(k)
Judicial interpretation of section 1821(k) as a minimum standard will help promote "a safe and stable system of affordable housing finance" by ensuring a continued flow of affordable mortgage financing. 88 During the period immediately preceding and extending through the current S&L crisis, institutions that traditionally concentrated their lending activities in home mortgage financing increasingly transferred their funds into riskier and more speculative investments. 89 era/ deposit insurance funds on a sound financial footing for the future; (6) to establish an Acquisition development and construction lending became common where 100 percent or more of project funding, including reserves for interest, were often provided by the lender in exchange for a participation in profits.
Overnight a number of thrifts went from single-family home lending to more exotic loan and investment vehicles. The lending program for certain of these thrifts was typified by poor underwriting procedures and an emphasis on taking risks, as thrift managers played an aggressive lending game in which "heads they would win and tails the FSLIC would lose."
CPA's Hearing, supra note 70, at 60; see also H.R. REP. No. 54, lOlst Cong., 1st sess., pt. 7, at 6 (1989), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 421, 426 ("The tendency of weakly capitalized thrifts to un-These speculative investments played a major role in causing the current crisis by rendering many institutions insolvent as the investments increasingly failed. 90 Allowing the FDIC to pursue negligence actions against the officers and directors of insured financial institutions should inhibit the unreasonably speculative investment of an institution's funds. 91 Because officers and directors know they may be forced to reimburse the FDIC for any losses caused by their overly speculative investment strategy, they are more likely to channel investment funds into the home lending market, thereby allowing more people to borrow funds necessary for home ownership. 92 Most importantly, depositors' funds will be much safer and the FDIC's liability much less than current levels. 93 AJJ.y deposit insurance system must ultimately deal with the problem of "moral hazard. 91. FIRREA should not be read as an attempt to eliminate entirely the element of risk from an institution's asset portfolio, clearly an impossibility. See Scott, supra note 89, at 1894. This Note does suggest that savings associations should either devote more resources to traditional home mortgage lending or, if they should expand into other areas, retain employees who have the necessary expertise to formulate wise investment strategies and decisions. If an institution aggressively devotes its funds to nontraditional investments and the institution is harmed as a result of the new investment strategy, managers that did not consult persons who have special expertise in the new area of investment should be found to be negligent.
92. The FDIC's proposed new rules, which lessen the costs incurred by S&Ls in making mortgage loans, should further expand the funds available for home mortgage lending. institution can undertake risky investments, confident that the insurance fund will ultimately cover all the institution's losses. 95 Similarly, the insurance fund also gives insured depositors little incentive to impose discipline on the lending industry. 96 Furthermore, for those institutions that are publicly traded, neither shareholder discipline nor discipline imposed by the takeover market has effectively deterred opportunism, excessive risk-taking, or other managerial conduct that can lead to insolvency.97 Interpreting section 1821(k) to allow negligence actions will help the FDIC deal with the moral hazard problem. By holding the officers and directors of financial institutions liable for any losses that they cause through negligent conduct, FIRREA gives these individuals greater incentive to make sounder, safer, and more prudent operating decisions. If officers and directors must reimburse the fund for losses caused by their negligent conduct, they should be sufficiently deterred from poor and uninformed decisionmaking. 97. Garten, supra note 96, at 1177, 1187-94; cf id. at 1177 n.104 (noting that agency costs allow management to pursue its own goals rather than those of the institution's real risk-bearers).
98. In addition to channeling money away from risky investment activities, a standard of negligence should force officers and directors of financial institutions to institute and follow prudent underwriting controls, 99 pay closer attention to federal banking regulations, 100 and obtain more information about potential lending activities. 101 Providing an institution's management with incentives to procure more information about potential borrowers and their uses of borrowed funds should result in better lending practices and lower costs to the FDIC and taxpayers. 102 Further, because credit risk -the possibility that borrowers will default on their loans -is the principal cause of the current S&L crisis, 103 a standard of care that causes financial institutions to strengthen their lending policies and supervisory mechanisms should reduce the default rate. 30, 1988) . In these banks, 81% either had no loan policies or failed to follow them; 69% had inadequate oversight mechanisms by which compliance with internal policies or banking laws could be ensured; 63% exhibited inadequate control and supervision of bank officers; 59% inadequately identified problem loans; 57% were dominated by a single officer, director, or stockholder; and 49% had nonexistent or inadequately followed policies for asset and liability management. Additionally, the OCC found that 86% of the failed banks had extremely liberal lending policies; 51 % had excessive loan growth in relation to the expertise and abilities of management and the internal oversight systems; 41% placed undue reliance on overly volatile assets; 38% had inadequate liquid assets; 81 % exhibited inadequate credit examinations and reports; 72% showed overlending to borrowers; 53% lent based on collateral value rather than cash flow; and 36% showed an unwarranted concentration of credits. Insider abuse was found to be a significant factor in 35% of the failed banks. Id. at 93,981-82.
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The interpretation of section 1821(k) as providing a m1mmum standard of care will lessen the negative impact of financial institution failures. The decline of the S&L industry, or even the demise of a single institution, has many repercussions both locally and nationally. An institution's failure often freezes depositors' funds, imperils creditors of the institution, causes an increase in unemployment, and results in the consumption of valuable judicial and administrative resources.105 Furthermore, "[d]eposit insurance gives certain innocent bystanders -healthy banks and their depositors, the bank regulatory system, and the public -a stake in bank failure that is more direct than ... in other business failure." 106 This interest arises because each failure can result in higher insurance premiums for healthy banksand at least part of this increased cost of doing business is likely to be passed on to consumers -and a loss of public confidence in the system.107 A negligence standard should lead to a more careful and better informed decisionmaking process, 108 minimizing economic disruptions and declines in consumer confidence caused by failures. 109 The minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k) will increase the contribution of the private sector, reducing the cost to the taxpayers of the S&L bailout. If courts allow the FDIC to pursue negligence actions, it will be able to recover funds from those individuals who, through their negligence, helped to cause the current S&L crisis, thereby reducing the amount of taxpayer funds that must be expended to resolve the crisis. 110 If the FDIC can pursue negligence actions against officers and directors, it will be able to recover from a greater number of culpable individuals than if gross negligence was the uniform standard of care. 111 By enlarging the pool of potential targets, FIRREA expands the amount of total liability and thereby increases the amount of private contributions to the bailout fund. 112 The minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k) also strengthens both the FDIC's enforcement powers and the sanctions imposed on those who harm insured depository institutions. 113 Congress, through FIRREA, sought to strengthen civil sanctions against those persons who damage insured financial institutions. 114 Interpreting section 1821(k) as providing a uniform gross negligence standard, however, would have the opposite effect. Instead of being able to plead and prove simple negligence on the part of a defendant, the FDIC would be forced to plead and prove conduct amounting to at least gross negligence before it could recover squandered funds. 115 This interpretation would have the unanticipated result of imposing on the FDIC "a more stringent pleading burden [and burden of proof] than that which faced its predecessors in interest." 116 [Vol. 90:1119 ability to sue incompetent officers and directors of depository institutions.
Finally, by reading section 1821(k) as supplying a minimum standard, courts may ensure that all persons whose negligence contributed to the demise of an institution are made to bear the consequences. A negligence action is valuable as an additional enforcement mechanism available to the FDIC, especially in those cases in which the conduct at issue does not "present a strong basis for statutory enforcement proceedings." 117 A negligence action also gives the FDIC the opportunity to proceed in the most economically efficient fashion.11s
B. Arguments Advanced in Support of Interpreting Section 1821(k)
as a Uniform Standard
Deterring Competent Persons from Accepting Positions with Financial Institutions
Some have argued that the minimum standard interpretation of section 1821(k) would deter qualified and competent people from becoming officers and directors of financial institutions. 119 As one court has stated, "[o]ne motivation for sheltering officers and directors from claims for ordinary negligence is the important interest in encouraging aggressive and ambitious leaders to take the necessary steps to remedy the financial institution crisis this country faces." 120 The thrust of this argument is that a simple negligence standard deters risk-averse or risk-neutral people from becoming officers and directors.1 21 However, such people always have the option of procuring director and officer liability insurance (D&O insurance ("Directors and officers are normally cognizant of the potential liability that they may face as a result of their negligence, ineptitude or fraudulent misconduct and are, therefore, frequently covered by directors and officers liability insurance ..• ,").
own money on D&O insurance, prospective officers and directors may require the institution that is seeking their services to pay for or reimburse them for purchasing insurance as a condition to accepting the offer.
Even if officers and directors are forced to pay for the insurance themselves, a requirement that they bear a portion of the risk of their own negligence seems fair. These individuals seem a more appropriate group to bear the risk than the taxpayers, particularly given the prestige and significant renumeration of their positions. 123 Therefore, even if some extremely risk-averse people will decline to be officers or directors of financial institutions, the net effect on the pool of qualified people should not be inordinately large.
Moreover, a negligence standard may appropriately deter those people who lack the requisite qualifications or expertise from becoming directors of financial institutions. 124 Also, it is worth noting that the law imposes a negligence standard of liability on a myriad of activities and many competent people still participate in them. Finally, no one has shown any pattern of adverse effects on the number of persons accepting offers to become officers or directors of financial institutions in those states that allowed negligence actions against the officers and directors of financial institutions before the enactment of FIRREA.
"Crippling" Directors of Financial Institutions
At least one court has argued that a negligence standard judges the conduct of officers and directors on the basis of hindsight. 125 This standard may make officers and directors fearful of having their decisions second-guessed years later and, as a result, cause them to become "crippled, reluctant and ineffective." 126 However, all standards, not merely the negligence standard, evaluate conduct on the basis of hindsight. Even if courts were to read section 182l(k) as mandating a uniform standard of gross negligence, they would still judge on the basis [Vol. 90:1119 of hindsight; officers and directors would still be fearful of courts second-guessing their decisions. Additionally, there is no indication that a simple negligence standard "crippled" officers and directors in those states that followed such a standard before the passage of FIRREA.
Furthermore, the fact that directors and officers can meet a negligence standard relatively easily supports reading section 182l(k) to allow the FDIC to pursue negligence actions. 127 One commentator has suggested that directors and officers can lessen the probability of liability for negligence by taking ten easy steps: 128 (1) they should be thoroughly knowledgeable about their duties and the institution before accepting their positions; 129 (2) they must review all securities and regulatory filings for the prior three years; (3) they should request and receive necessary materials and agendas before board meetings and should attend those meetings; 130 (4) they must acquaint themselves with current directors and top management to ensure competence and lack of conflicts; (5) they should review all reports of examinations and correspondence from regulatory agencies for the prior three years; ( 6) they should review all communications between auditors and the institution for the prior three years; 131 (7) they must familiarize themselves with the existing plans for the future of the institution; (8) they must supervise and review the performance of management; 132 (9) they should disclose all conflicts of interest, their own and those of others; and (10) they must comply with all applicable laws. If they do not take these steps as consideration for the compensation and prestige they receive by virtue of their position, they ought to be held liable for all acts that damage the institution.133
Fear of Frivolous Actions
One court suggested that interpreting FIRREA to provide a uniform standard of gross negligence will prevent the FDIC from pursuing costly litigation that it has little chance of winning. 134 No evidence exists, however, to prove that the FDIC is bringing or will bring actions in which it has little chance of prevailing on the merits. 135 The FDIC does not have unlimited funds-its sole economically rational choice is to pursue only cases in which it has a relatively high probability of recovering taxpayers' dollars. 136 This probability is determined only after extensive investigation into the circumstances surrounding the failure of an insured institution. 137 The FDIC, on its own, has an incentive not to bring frivolous actions.
Disservice of Federal Interests
The most forceful argument in favor of the uniform gross negligence standard is that such a standard will "clearly establish[ ] the parameters of liability for the benefit of officers and directors and the FDIC." 138 However, "there is no federal interest in uniformity for its own sake." 139 The true federal interest supports the minimum standard interpretation because institutions whose officers and directors are not liable for acts inconsistent with the goals of the deposit insurance system should not be insured. If states, acting under their traditional authority in this area, 140 wish to hold the officers of statechartered S&Ls to a more exacting standard, they should be allowed to do so. Such a standard will increase both protection for the deposit insurance fund and security for those state residents who deposit their life savings in an insured depository institution.1 41
Additionally, interpreting FIRREA to allow the FDIC to bring simple negligence actions will not create uncertainty. Directors and officers should know whether the state in which their financial institu- [Vol. 90:1119 tion is incorporated permits representatives of the institution to pursue negligence actions against them. The mere fact that a potential director or officer does not know such a fundamental fact suggests that she is not qualified to hold a position with potentially large liabilities.
CONCLUSION
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 attempted in section 1821(k) to give the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation a tool that it could use to recover funds from those parties who helped to bring about the current crisis. However, that tool is now in danger of being lost. A minority of courts have interpreted section 1821(k) to remove from the FDIC's arsenal the ability to pursue simple negligence actions against officers and directors of failed institutions. The courts following this interpretation have held that section 1821(k) implements a uniform standard of care and thereby preempts all state law in this area. Because the standard of care under section 1821(k) is gross negligence, these courts have held that the FDIC can no longer pursue some of the parties who are responsible for the current crisis.
The majority view is that section 182l(k) sets a minimum standard that preempts all state law that allows a more relaxed standard of care. The courts adhering to this interpretation have held that the FDIC is still able to pursue simple negligence claims in those states that allow such actions. These courts interpret section 182l(k) in a way that aids the FDIC in its quest to seek out and recover funds from those officers and directors who are responsible for an insured institution's failure.
The plain meaning of section 182l(k) supports the majority view that FIRREA merely sets a minimum standard of care of gross negligence. The legislative history surrounding the passage of FIRREA and, specifically, section 1821(k) shows that Congress did not intend to preempt all state law in this area, but only to set a minimum standard. Finally, the policies and goals served by FIRREA support the majority view that section 182l(k) sets a minimum, not a uniform, standard of care.
FIRREA gives the FDIC greater regulatory and enforcement powers over financial institutions by greatly revising the existing law governing the conduct of officers and directors of financial institutions. In response to the enormous cost imposed on the general public by the actions of people within the S&L industry, Congress attempted to ensure that such a debacle would never again occur. It would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the FDIC if this zealous protection of the deposit insurance fund were interpreted to strip the FDIC of one of its most powerful weapons in the fight against incompetence and fraud. Courts should interpret section 1821(k) to permit the FDIC to pursue negligence actions in those states that allow them.
